While the subformula property is usually a trivial consequence of cut-admissibility in sequent calculi, it is unclear in which cases the subformula property implies cut-admissibility. In this paper, we identify two wide families of propositional sequent calculi for which this is the case: the (generalized) subformula property is equivalent to cutadmissibility. For this purpose, we employ a semantic criterion for cut-admissibility, which allows us to uniformly handle a wide variety of calculi. Our results shed light on the relation between these two fundamental properties of sequent calculi, and can be useful to simplify cut-admissibility proofs in various calculi for non-classical logics, where the subformula property (equivalently, the property known as "analytic cut-admissibility") is easier to show than cut-admissibility. 1
Introduction
In his seminal paper [19] , Gentzen introduced the first sequent calculi, systems LK and LJ, as technical devices for studying classical and intuitionistic logics (respectively). His "Main Theorem" (Hauptsatz) was the cut-elimination theorem, from which he, and later others, derived several important consequences. In particular, since the cut rule is the only rule of these systems whose premises may include a formula that is not a subformula of (some formula in) the conclusion, the admissibility of cut immediately implies "the subformula property" for these systems. That is: when deriving a sequent s it suffices to only consider the syntactic material contained in s, i.e., to compose the derivation only from subformulas of s. Other formulas may sometimes shorten the derivation, but are never necessary.
Since then the framework of sequent calculi (and its various extensions) is widely applied in prooftheory and automated deduction, especially when one is interested in the computational aspects of a logic (e.g., [18] ). Various important non-classical logics-e.g., modal logics [40, 33] , many-valued and fuzzy logics [9, 27] , and paraconsistent logics [10] -admit a proof-theoretic presentation using some sequent calculus for which cut-admissibility holds. In all these cases, the subformula property (or some generalization of it) trivially follows.
In this paper, we are interested in the converse direction:
Is cut-admissibility a corollary of the subformula property?
If a calculus enjoys the subformula property, then one can easily deduce that some cuts are never needed (a.k.a. non-analytic cuts): these are the cuts that (read bottom-up) introduce some formula that is not included in the final sequent to be proved. Indeed, the subformula property ensures that such detours are always redundant. Nevertheless, the subformula property gives us no guarantees about the admissibility of, so-called, analytic cuts, where the cut formula is a subformula of the final sequent.
Clearly, one cannot expect a general affirmative answer to the question above:
1. There are several logics for which a cut-free sequent calculus appears beyond reach, but nevertheless logicians settled with a sequent calculus that enjoys the subformula property. In particular, this is the case for the modal logics S5 (of universal Kripke frames) and B (of symmetric Kripke frames), bi-intuitionistic logic [31, 32] , as well as several paraconsistent logics [8] (see Example 5.6 below). Notably, these calculi are substantially more complicated than Gentzen's original systems. They all involve logical rules that restrict, in one way or another, the formulas that may appear as context while applying the rule, and combine such restrictions in non-trivial ways. For example, the calculus for bi-intuitionistic logic has logical rules that can be applied only without context formulas on the righthand side, as well as rules that can be applied only when the left-hand side has no context formulas.
2. Even a simple syntactic manipulation on LK yields an alternative calculus for classical logic that still enjoys the subformula property, but requires cuts in various derivations. One may turn the logical rules of LK to axiomatic rules. For example, the right-introduction rule of negation will then have the form:
The resulting calculus is equivalent to LK (e.g., Γ ⇒ ¬ϕ, ∆ can be derived from Γ ⇒ ϕ, ¬ϕ, ∆ and Γ, ϕ ⇒ ∆ using a cut); it enjoys the subformula property; but it does not admit cut-admissibility (see Example 4.1 below).
The main contribution of this paper is an affirmative answer to the question above for two wide families of propositional multiple-conclusion sequent calculi. The first is a family of pure calculi (in terms of [4] ) whose derivation rules do not impose any restrictions on context formulas, of which LK is the prototype example. The second is a family of sequent calculi, which we call intuitionistic calculi, in which premises of the form Γ ⇒ ∆ with Γ = ∅ in right introduction rules forbid context formulas on the right-hand side.
The well-known multiple-conclusion calculus for intuitionistic logic (see [38] ) is the prototype example for an intuitionistic calculus. In both families, we further require the rules to have a certain "directed" structure (precisely defined below), thus avoiding the mentioned counterexamples above.
Besides its theoretical interest, we believe that our result can be useful in future investigation and development of sequent calculi. While the subformula property is traditionally proved as a consequence of cut-admissibility, there are other approaches to show that a certain calculus enjoys the subformula property. One prominent way is the semantic approach (see, e.g., [29] ), often employed when cutadmissibility is beyond reach (see, e.g., [37] ), or when general families of calculi are studied (see, e.g., [12, 23] ). These are essentially completeness proofs: for a calculus and a sound semantics for it, one constructs a countermodel for a sequent s provided that s has no derivation that consists only of subformulas of s. In fact, such semantic proofs tend to be simpler than syntactic cut-elimination proofs. They are also much easier to generalize and uniformly apply to families of calculi. In particular, the paper [23] provides a sufficient criterion for the subformula property in a general family of calculi, which reduces it to showing that certain partial models can be always extended to full ones. Using this characterization, our recent paper [24] provides a method for proving the subformula property for a wide family of calculi for sub-classical logics. Using the result of the current paper, we obtain the admissibility of cut in all these calculi.
Our proof in this paper follows a similar semantic approach. It is based on two different semantics for a given calculus: (i) a semantics for the case that derivations are confined to consist only of subformulas of the end sequent; and (ii) a semantics for the cut-free fragment of the calculus. The second paves the way to a sufficient semantic criterion for cut-admissibility. Then, the crux of our proof is to show that this criterion is met when the calculus enjoys the subformula property. As a result, we obtain that the cut rule is admissible given that the calculus enjoys the subformula property. Note that we focus only on the admissibility of the cut rule, rather than offering some effective procedure to eliminate cuts.
In order for our result to cover a wide variety of logics, we consider here a generalization of the subformula property. This is necessary to accommodate, e.g., sequent calculi for many-valued logics and paraconsistent logics that do not admit the strict subformula property, but do admit a simple generalization of it. For example, in sequent calculi for the family of C-systems from [10] , if a sequent s is derivable, then there exists a derivation of s that uses only subformulas of s and their negations. We therefore assume a general notion of subformula, based on a general ordering of propositional formulas.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First, in Section 2, we define the family of pure sequent calculi and cut-admissibility. Section 3 defines a generalized notion of the subformula property. In Section 4, we prove our result concerning pure calculi, by considering semantic characterizations of derivability in them, based on three-valued valuation functions. Finally, Section 5 introduces the family of intuitionistic sequent calculi, and proves a similar result for this family, again going through semantic characterizations of derivability, which is based on three-valued intuitionistic-like Kripke models.
Related Work Avron and Lev [12] introduced and studied the family of canonical calculi, a restricted sub-family of pure calculi, and proved the equivalence of the subformula property and cut-admissibility in them. The proof of this equivalence was semantic, based on the framework of Nmatrices [11] , a simple generalization of logical matrices, which was shown to precisely account for canonical calculi.
Our work goes far beyond canonical calculi, and so Nmatrices do not suffice. Rather, the framework that we use here is an extension of bivaluation semantics. Bivaluation semantics, introduced by Béziau [14] (see also [15] ), is a simple semantic framework for pure calculi that is based on two-valued valuation functions. In [14] , it was shown how to associate a set of bivaluations to arbitrary pure calculi, in a way that will ensure soundness and completeness.
Later, Lahav and Avron [23] extended this framework in two respects: first, it was generalized from plain valuation functions to Kripke models, which uniformly accommodate a much wider family of sequent calculi, that includes, among others, pure and intuitionistic calculi; second, and more importantly for the purpose of the current paper, they provided semantic counterparts for important syntactic properties, including cut-admissibility. A general soundness and completeness theorem was proved, which associates a class of two-valued Kripke models for each calculus of a general family of sequent calculi, and allows the formulation of sufficient semantic criteria for cut-admissibility and the subformula property. The former amounts to the ability to refine three-valued valuations into two-valued ones, while the latter amounts to the ability to extend partial two-valued valuations into full valuations. Then, in a previous work [25] , we showed that for pure calculi, the criterion for the subformula property is also necessary. For the present paper, however, the mere ability to extend partial two-valued valuations is not enough, and a constructive extension method is introduced. Moreover, the fact that this criterion is sufficient also for the Kripke-style counterpart is new. The semantic framework that we employ here closely follows the one of [23] , adapted and simplified for the particular families of calculi studied in this paper.
Finally, in previous work [24] , we studied general conditions for the subformula property in pure calculi, while cut-admissibility was not considered at all.
Pure Sequent Calculi
In this section, we define the family of pure sequent calculi [4] , as well as the notion of cut-admissibility. Several examples of well-known calculi that belong to this family are provided as well.
Preliminaries
Let At = {p 1 , p 2 , . . .} denote a fixed infinite set of propositional variables. A propositional language L is given by a set 3 L of connectives. L-formulas are defined as usual, where atomic L-formulas are the elements of At. We usually identify a propositional language with its set of formulas (e.g., when writing expressions like ϕ ∈ L). For a set F ⊆ L, by F-formula we mean a formula ϕ satisfying ϕ ∈ F.
An L-substitution is a function σ : At → L, naturally extended to all L-formulas and to sets of L-formulas (by putting σ( (ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n )) = (σ(ϕ 1 ), . . . , σ(ϕ n )) for every n-ary connective ∈ 3 L , and
An L-sequent is a pair of finite sets Γ and ∆ of L-formulas, denoted Γ ⇒ ∆. We employ the standard sequent notations, e.g., when writing expressions like Γ, ϕ ⇒ ∆ or ⇒ ϕ. The union of two
We denote by frm[Γ ⇒ ∆] the set Γ ∪ ∆, and extend this notation to sets of sequents, by putting frm
In what follows, L denotes an arbitrary propositional language. When L can be inferred from the context, we omit the prefix "L-" from the notions above (as well as from the ones introduced below).
Pure Sequent Calculi
Following [12] , we find it technically convenient to use the object propositional language for specifying derivation rules. (One could use meta-variables and rule schemes instead.) Definition 2.1. A pure L-rule is a pair S, s , denoted S / s, where S is a finite set of L-sequents and s is an L-sequent. The elements of S are called the premises of the rule and s is called the conclusion of the rule. We sometimes omit set braces around the premises, and separate them by semi-colons (e.g., when writing expressions like
An L-application of a pure L-rule s 1 , . . . , s n / s is a pair of the form {σ(s 1 ) ∪ c 1 , . . . , σ(s n ) ∪ c n } , σ(s) ∪ c 1 ∪ . . . ∪ c n where σ is an L-substitution, and c 1 , . . . , c n are L-sequents (called the context sequents of the application). The sequents σ(s i ) ∪ c i are called the premises of the application, and the sequent σ(s) ∪ c 1 ∪ . . . ∪ c n is called the conclusion of the application.
Example 2.2. The pure rules for introducing implication in classical logic are:
Their applications take the form (respectively):
Examples for derivation rules that cannot be formulated as pure rules include the following rule schemes, which are employed in intuitionistic and modal logic:
Pure calculi, in turn, are simply finite sets of pure rules. Definition 2.3. A pure L-calculus is a finite set of pure L-rules. A derivation of a sequent s from a set S of sequents (a.k.a. "assumptions" or "non-logical axioms") in a pure L-calculus G is a finite sequence of sequents, where each sequent in the sequence is either one of the following: (i) an element of S; (ii) the conclusion of an application of a rule of G, all premises of which are preceding elements of the sequence; (iii) the conclusion of one of the following standard structural rules, 2 again where all premises are preceding elements of the sequence:
In (CUT), ϕ is called the cut formula.
We write S G s if there exists a derivation of a sequent s from a set S of sequents in G.
In what follows, unless stated otherwise, we may refer to pure rules and pure calculi simply as rules and calculi.
The most well-studied property of sequent calculi is the admissibility of the cut rule. When cut is admissible the calculus is generally considered well-behaved, and reasoning about the calculus becomes much easier. Moreover, proof-search algorithms have no need to "guess" the cut formulas. Next, we precisely define cut-admissibility. What we call here cut-admissibility is actually known as strong cut-admissibility, in which cuts are allowed, but they are confined to cases where the cut formula appears in the set of assumptions [5] . Usual cut-admissibility, which we call here weak cut-admissibility, only requires that G s iff cf G s for every sequent s. For pure calculi, however, the two notions turn out to be equivalent (see [5] ). (This is not the case for intuitionistic calculi, studied in Section 5.)
Next, we present several examples of pure calculi (they all enjoy cut-admissibility).
Example 2.5 (Classical Logic). The propositional language CL consists of three binary connectives ∧, ∨, ⊃, and one unary connective ¬. The propositional fragment of Gentzen's fundamental sequent calculus for classical logic [19] can be directly presented as a pure CL-calculus, denoted LK, that consists of the following CL-rules:
Example 2.6 (Paraconsistent Logics). In [10] , sequent calculi for various paraconsistent logics are presented. For example, a pure calculus for da Costa's historical paraconsistent logic C 1 , which we call G C 1 , consists of the rules of LK except for the left introduction rule of negation that is replaced by the following pure CL-rules:
Similarly, a pure calculus G P 1 for the atomic paraconsistent logic P 1 was given in [3] . It is obtained by replacing the left introduction rule of negation in LK with the following alternative rules:
Example 2.7 (Many-valued Logics). In [6] , pure sequent calculi for well-known many-valued logics are presented. For example, a calculus for Łukasiewicz three-valued logic, which we call G 3 , has the following rules for implication:
A pure calculus for the CL-fragment of the logic of bilattices [2] (whose implication-free fragment coincides with the logic of first-degree entailments [1] ), which we call G 4 , is obtained in a similar manner, by augmenting the negation-free fragment of LK with the following rules:
Example 2.8 (Logic for efficient access control). Primal infon logic [16] was designed to efficiently reason about access control policies. The quotations-free fragment of its sequent calculus [13] can be presented as a pure calculus, which we denote by P. It is obtained from the negation-free fragment of LK by adding the axiomatic rules ∅ / ⇒ and ∅ / ⊥ ⇒ , dismissing the left introduction rule of disjunction, and replacing the right introduction rule of implication with the following weaker rule:
While all the calculi in the examples above admit cut-admissibility, some of them do not enjoy the subformula property, but do enjoy a simple generalization of it, which we introduce in the next section.
Analyticity: A Generalized Subformula Property
Roughly speaking, analyticity of a propositional calculus provides a computable bound on the formulas that may appear in derivations of a sequent s from a set S of sequents. The special case of the subformula property is obtained when the set of subformulas of formulas in S ∪ {s} constitutes such a bound. Many useful calculi, however, do not admit this strict property, while still allowing some other effective bound. Here, we generalize the subformula property, by assuming a given ordering of L-formulas, denoted ≺, which has to satisfy certain properties, as defined next.
Notation 3.1. Given a binary relation R on L, we denote by R [ϕ] the set {ψ ∈ L | ψ, ϕ ∈ R}. This notation is naturally extended to sets (
Definition 3.2. An order relation (i.e., an irreflexive and transitive binary relation) ≺ on L is called:
In what follows, ≺ denotes an arbitrary prefinite and structural order relation over L. The prefiniteness of ≺ will be used in order to enumerate the formulas of the language according to this order. Structurality is essential in order to lift arguments about pure rules to their applications.
Example 3.3. The usual subformula relation over CL, which we denote by ≺ 0 , is a prefinite structural order relation. Another useful prefinite structural order relation on CL, denoted ≺ 1 , is given by ϕ ≺ 1 ψ iff ϕ ≺ 0 ψ or (ϕ = ψ and ϕ = ¬ψ for some ψ ≺ 0 ψ).
The above definition allows us to present a generalization of the subformula property, which we call ≺-analyticity. 
This generalization of the subformula property does not necessarily inherit its most important consequence, which is decidability. To ensure decidability, it is also required that the function λϕ ∈ L.≺ [ϕ] is computable. Clearly, if S is finite and ≺ admits this property, it is decidable whether S ≺ G s. When G is ≺-analytic, the same holds for G .
Remark 3.5. The relation ≺ G is non standard, as it may lack a natural transitivity property. For example, consider a calculus G consisting of the rules
Considering the examples above, LK, G P 1 and P are ≺ 0 -analytic; while G C 1 , G 3 and G 4 are not ≺ 0 -analytic, but are ≺ 1 -analytic. These facts can be derived from cut-admissibility, and also by the method presented in [24] . The infinite family of calculi for weak double negations from [20] , presented in the next example, goes beyond ≺ 0 and ≺ 1 .
Example 3.6. In [20] , Kamide provides a way of constructing sequent calculi for paraconsistent logics that admit the double negation principle, as well as its weaker forms (e.g., ¬¬¬ψ ↔ ¬ψ). For this purpose, the paper investigates a hierarchy of weak double negations, by presenting an infinite set {L2 n+2 | n ∈ N} of pure calculi, all of which admit cut-admissibility. For example, L4 is identical to the calculus G 4 from Example 2.7, and is ≺ 1 -analytic. Furthermore, for every n, let ≺ n be the transitive closure of the relation n , defined by: ϕ n ψ iff either ψ = ¬ϕ, or ψ = ϕ 1 ϕ 2 and ϕ = ¬ m ϕ i for some ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 , ∈ {∧, ∨, ⊃}, 0 ≤ m ≤ n, and i ∈ {1, 2} (where ¬ n is defined by:
Clearly, the previous definitions of ≺ 0 and ≺ 1 coincide with the new ones.
For many calculi, including those presented above, all rules except (CUT) are ≺-ordered: in every application of the rule, every formula ϕ that appears in the premises satisfies ϕ ψ for some formula ψ that appears in the conclusion. For such calculi, cut-admissibility immediately entails ≺-analyticity, as every cut-limited derivation is ≺-analytic. Whether or not the converse holds is the subject of the next section.
From Analyticity to Cut-admissibility
In this section we address the question of the equivalence of ≺-analyticity and cut-admissibility in pure calculi. First, note that ≺-analyticity may not imply cut-admissibility:
Example 4.1. Consider the calculus LK AX that consists of the following axiomatic rules:
Its rules, besides the two rules of implication, were already identified by Gentzen as equivalent to their original counterparts (see Remark 2.2 in [19] ). It can be easily shown that LK AX is ≺ 0 -analytic (using the fact that LK is ≺ 0 -analytic). However, it does not admit cut-admissibility (for instance, the sequent p 1 ∧ p 2 ⇒ p 1 ∨ p 2 has no cut-free derivation).
Next, we identify a family of calculi in which analyticity does imply cut-admissibility.
and s has the form ⇒ ϕ or ϕ ⇒ for some formula ϕ.
The calculi LK, G P 1 and P are ≺ 0 -directed, G C 1 , G 3 and G 4 are ≺ 1 -directed, and for every n, L2 n+2 is ≺ n+1 -directed. In contrast, LK AX is not ≺-directed for any ≺, as its conclusions include several formulas.
Our first main result is that ≺-analyticity guarantees cut-admissibility in the family of ≺-directed pure calculi. Theorem 4.3. Every ≺-analytic ≺-directed pure calculus enjoys cut-admissibility.
We prove Theorem 4.3 in Section 4.1. Note that for all the calculi mentioned above (except LK AX ), this theorem allows one to obtain cut-admissibility as a consequence of them being ≺-directed and ≺-analytic for some (prefinite and structural) order ≺.
It is worth mentioning that the equivalence of ≺ 0 -analyticity and cut-admissibility was proved in [12] for a subfamily of pure calculi, called canonical calculi. These are ≺ 0 -directed pure calculi in which the premises only contain atomic variables and the formula in the conclusion includes a single connective. A simple syntactic criterion called coherence was defined in [12] and was proved to be equivalent both to ≺ 0 -analyticity and cut-admissibility.
Before turning to the proof of Theorem 4.3, we outline two possible applications of it in cutadmissibility proofs:
Simpler Semantic Proofs of Cut-admissibility Theorem 4.3 reduces the burden in proving cut-admissibility to establishing only analytic cutadmissibility. An application of (CUT) in a derivation of s from S is called a ≺-analytic cut if the cut formula is in ≺ [S ∪ {s}]. In turn, ≺-analytic cut-admissibility concerns only the admissibility of non-≺-analytic cuts. Proving this property is often easier than showing full cut-admissibility. For example, it is straightforward to prove that LK is complete for the classical truth tables, when applications of (CUT) are restricted to be ≺ 0 -analytic. Indeed, assuming s is not derivable from S in LK using ≺ 0 -analytic cuts, one extends s to a maximal underivable sequent s * that consists solely of ≺ 0 [S ∪ {s}]-formulas. Then, a countermodel v can be defined simply by setting v(ϕ) = T for every ϕ on the left-hand side of s * , and v(ψ) = F for every ψ on its right-hand side. Using ≺ 0 -analytic cuts, it immediately follows that
, which makes it easy to prove that v respects the classical truth tables, and can therefore be extended to a full classical countermodel. By Theorem 4.3, we may conclude that LK enjoys cut-admissibility. Providing a semantic proof of cut-admissibility without going through ≺ 0 -analytic cuts is possible, but more complicated.
Sufficient Criterion for Cut-admissibility
The results of this paper are useful in combination with our recent paper [24] , where we provided a general method for proving ≺ n -analyticity (see Example 3.6 for the definition of ≺ n ) in a wide family of pure calculi. Concretely, we showed that the ≺ n -analyticity of a ≺ n -directed calculus G is guaranteed if the following property holds: 3 ( * ) For every two rules of G of the forms S 1 / ⇒ ϕ 1 and S 2 / ϕ 2 ⇒ , and substitutions σ 1 , σ 2 such that σ 1 (ϕ 1 ) = σ 2 (ϕ 2 ), the empty sequent is derivable from σ(S 1 ) ∪ σ(S 2 ) using only (CUT).
A direct consequence of Theorem 4.3 and the results of [24] is a simple, syntactic and decidable criterion for cut-admissibility: Corollary 4.4. Every pure ≺ n -directed calculus for which ( * ) holds enjoys cut-admissibility.
Cut-admissibility for all calculi considered above (except for LK AX ) can be obtained by applying Corollary 4.4.
Proof of Theorem 4.3
Cut-admissibility is traditionally proved syntactically, by some form of induction on derivations. In this case, what is actually shown is cut-elimination: a method to eliminate cuts from derivations. However, going back at least to [35] , semantic methods have also shown to be useful to prove cut-admissibility. We follow the semantic approach, and base our proof on several "semantic maneuvers". We start by presenting the bivaluation semantic framework from [14] that accounts for derivability in pure sequent calculi. Then, we generalize this framework to obtain a characterization of ≺-analytic derivations, as well as of cut-limited derivations. The latter characterization allows us to define a semantic sufficient condition for cut-admissibility, which we show to hold in ≺-analytic ≺-directed calculi.
The soundness and completeness theorems of this section can be obtained using the general framework of [23] . To assist the reader, we outline in the appendix direct proofs of these theorems, while employing our current notations and definitions.
Semantics of Pure Sequent Calculi
We start by presenting the bivaluations semantics from [14] that captures derivability in pure calculi, and is based on a two-valued interpretation of pure rules.
We say that v satisfies a set S of sequents, denoted v |= S, if v |= s for every s ∈ S. Definition 4.6. A bivaluation v respects a rule S / s if v |= σ(s) whenever v |= σ(S) for every substitution σ. v is called G-legal for a calculus G if it respects all rules of G.
Depending on G, this semantics may not be truth-functional, that is, the value of a compound formula is not uniquely determined by the values of its immediate subformulas. For this reason valuation functions are defined over the entire language rather than only over atomic formulas. Example 4.7 (Semantics of Classical Logic). It is easy to see that a CL-bivaluation v is LK-legal iff it respects the classical truth tables. For example, the first line of the truth table for conjunction is obtained as follows: Suppose that v(ϕ) = v(ψ) = 1. Then v |= { ⇒ ϕ, ⇒ ψ}, and since v respects the right introduction rule of conjunction, we have v |= ⇒ ϕ ∧ ψ, and so v(ϕ ∧ ψ) = 1.
The semantic reading of rules as constraints on bivaluations provides an equivalent semantic view of derivations:
Example 4.9. G 3 -legal bivaluations provide an alternative semantics to Łukasiewicz three-valued logic (Example 2.7). For example, the rule
translates into the following semantic condition:
This semantics is two-valued, but not truth-functional. Another two-valued semantics for this logic was presented in [36] , and was then used to construct a different calculus for it in [14] .
Semantics of Analytic Derivations
Theorem 4.8 establishes a strong connection between derivations in pure calculi and bivaluations (twovalued assignments). Analytic derivations in such calculi induce a similar semantics, which is based on three-valued truth assignments. Roughly speaking, in the case that ≺-analytic derivations are taken into account, only [S ∪ {s}]-formulas are allowed to occur in derivations, and thus we only need these formulas to be assigned with a truth-value. To implement this idea, we include a third truth-value marking formulas that are not assigned with any "real" truth-value. Thus, the semantics for analytic derivations is based on three truth-values: "false", "true", and "indeterminate", represented as −1, 1, and 0, respectively. 
v satisfies a set S of sequents, denoted v |= S, if v |= s for every s ∈ S. G-legal trivaluations are defined like in the case of bivaluations using the new definition of |=. When semantically describing the existence of a ≺-analytic derivation of a sequent s from a set S of sequents in a calculus G, some formulas must be assigned with either 1 or −1. These are the formulas that are allowed to appear in such a derivation, that is, the formulas in [S ∪ {s}]. For this requirement, we introduce the following definition:
Definition 4.12. The support of a trivaluation v, denoted supp(v), is the set {ϕ ∈ L | v(ϕ) = 0}. v is called:
Note that every trivaluation is ∅-determined, and that bivaluations are fully determined trivaluations (and they will be called this way from now on).
Trivaluations correspond to analytic derivations in the following way:
Note that only soundness of analytic derivations with respect to [S ∪ {s}]-determined trivaluations is needed in the proof of Theorem 4.3.
Semantics in the Absence of Cut
The semantics of cut-limited derivations is similar to that of analytic derivations. The only difference is that cut-limited derivations of s from S are tied to frm[S]-determined trivaluations, rather than to [S ∪ {s}]-determined ones. Intuitively, if ϕ cannot serve as a cut formula, we may need a trivaluation v that satisfies ⇒ ϕ and ϕ ⇒ , which is possible iff v(ϕ) = 0.
For cut-limited derivations, we have the following:
Note that only completeness of cut-limited derivations with respect to frm[S]-determined trivaluations is used in the proof of Theorem 4.3.
Remark 4.15. The three-valued semantics for the cut-free fragment of LK that is obtained from Theorem 4.14 induces the same set of trivaluations as the Nmatrix semantics from [22] . Theorem 4.14 gives rise to a sufficient semantic criterion for cut-admissibility, which is based on the following notion of determination: Definition 4.16. We say that a trivaluation v is a determination of a trivaluation v (alternatively, we say that v determines v) if v(ϕ) = v (ϕ) for every ϕ ∈ supp(v). v is called an F-determination of v if, in addition, it is F-determined. If v is fully determined, we call it a full determination of v.
It immediately follows from our definitions that: The sufficient semantic criterion for cut-admissibility is given in the following corollary:
From Analyticity to Cut-admissibility
We now prove Theorem 4.3, by utilizing Corollary 4.18. Thus, given a ≺-analytic ≺-directed pure calculus, we show that every G-legal trivaluation has a G-legal full determination. This is done in two steps: Lemma 4.19 below shows that it is possible to add a single formula to the support of a Glegal trivaluation. The extended trivaluation is proved to still be G-legal. Then, in Lemma 4.20, we iteratively apply Lemma 4.19 using an enumeration of all formulas that respects ≺, thus obtaining a full determination.
Proof. If ψ ∈ supp(v), then this is trivial, as v determines itself. We therefore assume that ψ / ∈ supp(v).
Clearly, v is a supp(v) ∪ {ψ}-determination of v. We prove that it is G-legal. Let s 1 , . . . , s n / s be a rule of G and σ a substitution. Suppose that v |= σ(s). We prove that v |= σ(s i ) for some
To show that there exists 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that v |= σ(s i ), we first prove that G σ(s) ∪ (Γ v ⇒ ∆ v ): by the above, either σ(s) = (ψ ⇒) or σ(s) = (⇒ ψ). In the first case, v (ψ) = 1, which means that
Thus v |= σ(s i ), and therefore v |= σ(s i ). Proof. For every trivaluation u and formula ψ, let u ψ denote an arbitrary G-legal supp(u) ∪ {ψ}-determination of u, if such exists (otherwise, u ψ is undefined). Note that whenever u is G-legal and ≺ [ψ] ⊆ supp(u), Lemma 4.19 ensures that u ψ is defined.
Let ψ 1 , ψ 2 , . . . be an enumeration of the formulas of L, such that i < j whenever ψ i ≺ ψ j . Such enumeration exists by the prefiniteness of ≺. For every i, denote the set {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ i } by Φ ≤i (in particular, Φ ≤0 = ∅).
Define 
, and therefore v i is actually a Φ ≤i -determination of v i−1 and of v. We now define v , a G-legal full determination of v. For every ϕ ∈ L, let i ϕ be the index of ϕ in the enumeration (that is,
Finally, let S / s be a rule of G and σ be a substitution. Let
, and therefore v |= σ(s).
Putting all pieces together we have proved Theorem 4.3: Assuming that G is ≺-analytic and ≺-directed, by Lemma 4.20, every G-legal L-trivaluation has a G-legal full determination, and cutadmissibility follows by Corollary 4.18.
Intuitionistic Calculi
For various important non-classical logics, such as intuitionistic logic, there is no known cut-free pure calculus. Gentzen's original calculus for this logic, LJ, is not pure, as it does not meet the requirement of allowing arbitrary context formulas in applications of rules: it manipulates single-conclusion sequents, in which the right-hand side includes at most one formula. There exists, however, an equivalent multipleconclusion cut-free sequent calculus, which we call LJ (see [38] ). This calculus restricts only the right introduction rules of implication and negation to single-conclusion sequents. In other words, LJ is obtained from LK by restricting applications of p 1 ⇒ p 2 / ⇒ p 1 ⊃ p 2 and p 1 ⇒ / ⇒ ¬p 1 to have the forms:
Put differently, LJ is obtained from LK by forbidding right context formulas in all premises with a non-empty left side of right introduction rules.
Another well-known calculus that follows this pattern, which we call G 4 , is obtained by extending the negation-free fragment of LJ with the rules for negation of G 4 (see Example 2.7). G 4 , investigated in [7, 39] , is sound and complete for Nelson's paraconsistent constructive logic N 4 [28] .
Next, we define a general family of calculi, which we call intuitionistic calculi, of which LJ and G 4 are particular examples. Like LJ and G 4 , intuitionistic calculi are sets of pure rules, but some of the applications of these rules are restricted. As in the previous section, we show that cut-admissibility is a consequence of ≺-analyticity in calculi of this family. Our proof, presented in Section 5.3, has a similar general structure as the proof for pure calculi, but is more challenging, because simple valuation functions do not suffice to characterize the calculi of this family. Instead, we introduce in Section 5.2 a more complex semantic interpretation, which is based on Kripke models.
Intuitionistic Derivations
In this section we precisely define the family of intuitionistic calculi, of which LJ and G 4 are particular examples. Note that both LJ and G 4 employ pure rules: LJ is based on the rules of LK, and G 4 is based on the rules of G 4 . The difference lies in the allowed applications of the rules: both calculi forbid right context formulas in premises of the form Γ ⇒ ∆ with Γ = ∅ of applications of rules that introduce some formula on the right-hand side. This is formalized as follows: 
4). We say that G enjoys Int-cut-admissibility if
The difference between pure and intuitionistic calculi is not in the rules, but rather in applications that are allowed to appear in derivations. Thus, any pure calculus has an intuitionistic counterpart, obtained by considering only intuitionistic derivations. Theorem 5.4, which we prove below, allows one to derive the fact that cut is admissible in LJ from the fact that LJ enjoys the subformula property. More precisely, Int-cut-admissibility of LK follows from its Int-≺ 0 -analyticity. Such entailment also holds for the pure calculi presented in the examples above, as well as for the calculi of the next example.
Example 5.5 (Constructive Negations). In [7] , Avron provides sequent calculi for logics that replace classical negation with several non-classical negations. One of the families investigated there consists of calculi that are obtained from the negation-free fragment of LJ by augmenting it with pure rules for negation. All calculi of this family, except those described in Example 5.6 below, allow only intuitionistic derivations, and are ≺ 1 -directed and Int-≺ 1 -analytic. From these facts, Theorem 5.4 allows us to conclude that cut is admissible in them. These calculi include a calculus for Nelson's constructive logic N 3 [28] , as well as the calculus G 4 presented above for its paraconsistent variant N 4 .
Intuitionistic derivations disallow right context formulas in premises of positive rules, in which the left-hand side is not empty. A natural question that arises regarding Theorem 5.4 is: Does it still hold if we allow right context formulas for certain premises of a right introduction rule with a non-empty left-hand side, and forbid them in others? The answer is negative as the next example demonstrates. Example 5.6 (Beyond Intuitionistic Derivations). Following Example 5.5, we note that [7, 8] investigate also several calculi that include both the single-conclusion right introduction rule of implication and the multiple-conclusion right introduction rule of negation. The former conforms with the restriction to intuitionistic derivations, as right context formulas are forbidden. The latter allows for non-intuitionistic derivations, as it allows right context formulas in a premise that has a non-empty left side. Such calculi are therefore left out from the scope of Theorems 4.3 and 5.4. Indeed, as shown in [8] , all of them are ≺ 1 -analytic, but none of them enjoys cut-admissibility. A particular example for such a calculus is the calculus from [34] for da-Costa's paraconsistent logic C w [17] , obtained from the positive fragment of LJ by adding the pure rules p 1 ⇒ / ¬¬p 1 ⇒ and p 1 ⇒ / ⇒ ¬p 1 .
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 5.4. Similarly to the case of pure calculi, we go through a semantic interpretation of intuitionistic derivations, which is defined next.
Semantics of Intuitionistic Calculi
The syntactic restriction on context sequents that are enforced in intuitionistic derivations requires elevating bivaluation semantics (Section 4.1) to Kripke-style semantics. Definition 5.7. An L-trimodel is a triple M = W, R, V , where W is a non-empty set (whose elements are called "worlds"), R is a transitive and reflexive relation over W , and V is a function that assigns a trivaluation V w to every w ∈ W , such that V is persistent, that is, for every ϕ ∈ L and w ∈ W , if V w (ϕ) = 1 then V u (ϕ) = 1 for every u such that wRu.
Next we introduce several useful notations and definitions concerning trimodels. Notation 5.8. Let M = W, R, V be a trimodel and w ∈ W . We denote the set {u ∈ W | wRu} by R (w), and the set {V u | u ∈ R (w)} by V R(w) . Definition 5.9. Let Σ be a set of trivaluations. Σ satisfies a sequent s, denoted Σ |= s, if v |= s for every v ∈ Σ (see Definition 4.10). Σ satisfies a set S of sequents, denoted Σ |= S, if Σ |= s for every s ∈ S. For a trimodel M = W, R, V , we write M |= s (M |= S) if {V w | w ∈ W } |= s ({V w | w ∈ W } |= S).
We turn to the semantic reading of pure rules in trimodels. Given a trimodel M = W, R, V and a world w in it, the interpretation of a pure rule in w may involve not only w itself, but also the elements of R (w): Definition 5.10. A trimodel M = W, R, V respects a rule r = S / s if one of the following holds for every w ∈ W and substitution σ:
• r is positive, and V w |= σ(s) whenever both of the followings hold:
2. V R(w) |= σ(s ) for every s ∈ S with a non-empty left side.
• r is not positive, and V w |= σ(s) whenever V w |= σ(S).
Example 5.11. Let M = W, R, V be a trimodel. M respects the right introduction rule of conjunction in LK iff for every w ∈ W we have that V w (ϕ ∧ ψ) > −1 whenever V w (ϕ) > −1 and V w (ψ) > −1. M respects the left introduction rule of implication in LK iff for every w ∈ W we have that V w (ϕ ⊃ ψ) < 1 whenever V w (ϕ) > −1 and V w (ψ) < 1. M respects the right introduction rule of implication in LK iff for every w ∈ W we have that V w (ϕ ⊃ ψ) > −1 whenever either V u (ϕ) < 1 or V u (ψ) > −1 for every u ∈ R (w). 
The semantic reading of derivation rules in Definitions 5.10 and 5.12 conforms with the essence of Kripke's semantics for intuitionistic logic, according to which "constructive truth" is more demanding than "classical truth". Thus, when introducing a formula on the right-hand side, some premises should be satisfied not only in the particular world in question, but also in all its accessible worlds.
Finally, the notion of determined trivaluations is generalized to trimodels in the most natural way:
M is called fully determined if V w is fully determined for every w ∈ W .
Example 5.14 (Semantics of Intuitionistic Logic). Recall that LJ is obtained by considering only intuitionistic derivations in LK. Accordingly, Definition 5.12 associates LJ with LK-legal trimodels. Following Example 5.11, it is easy to see that a fully determined CL-trimodel M = W, R, V is LK-legal iff it respects the usual truth conditions of the intuitionistic connectives. For example, the truth condition for implication is obtained as follows: Let w ∈ W , and suppose that for every u ∈ W such that wRu, we have that if
, and so V w |= ⇒ ϕ ⊃ ψ, which gives us V w (ϕ ⊃ ψ) = 1. For the other direction of the semantics of ⊃, suppose V u (ϕ) = 1 and V u (ψ) = −1 for some u ∈ W such that wRu. Since M is LK-legal, it respects the non-positive rule ⇒ p 1 ; p 2 ⇒ / p 1 ⊃ p 2 ⇒ , which means that V u |= ϕ ⊃ ψ ⇒ . This gives us V u (ϕ ⊃ ψ) = −1, and by the persistence condition, since M is fully determined, it follows that V w (ϕ ⊃ ψ) = −1.
After setting all required adjustments in definitions, Theorems 4.8, 4.13 and 4.14 are now given an intuitionistic variant. Like in the case of pure calculi, the following theorem can be obtained using the general framework of [23] . We outline in the appendix a direct proof of this theorem.
Theorem 5.15.
S G
Moreover, if G is ≺-ordered, then the converse holds as well.
Theorem 5.15 gives rise to a sufficient semantic criterion for Int-cut-admissibility that is a variant of Corollary 4.18: 
Proof of Theorem 5.4
The semantic view of intuitionistic calculi via Kripke-style semantics enables us to provide appropriate variants of Lemmas 4.19 and 4.20 above, and then, together with Corollary 5.17, to derive Theorem 5.4. We start by showing that a single formula can be added to the support of a given trimodel.
Lemma 5.19. Let G be an Int-≺-analytic ≺-directed calculus, M a G-legal trimodel and ψ a formula such that
Proof. Let M = W, R, V . For every w ∈ W , define the following sets:
and
We start by proving that for every
, and V * u = V u for every u ∈ W * . M * is a G-legal trimodel, as every requirement that is induced by the rules of G or by the definition of a trimodel only concerns accessible worlds. In addition, M * |= S w and
Define a G-legal supp(M)∪{ψ}-determination M = W, R, V of M as follows: for every w ∈ W and ϕ ∈ L, V w (ϕ) is defined by:
Let us show that M is a trimodel. Suppose for contradiction that V w (ϕ) = 1 and V u (ϕ) = 1 for some formula ϕ and u ∈ R (w). If ϕ = ψ or ϕ ∈ supp(V w ), then this contradicts the fact that M is a trimodel. If ϕ ∈ supp(V u ), then V u (ϕ) = −1, and then by definition V w (ϕ) = −1, which cannot be the case. Otherwise, ϕ = ψ, ϕ / ∈ supp(V w ), and ϕ / ∈ supp(V u ). Since ψ ∈ supp(M ) and V u (ϕ) = 1, we have V u (ϕ) = −1, and thus by the definition of V we must have either V z (ϕ) = −1 for some z ∈ R (u) ⊆ R (w), or S z G Int Γ z , ϕ ⇒ ∆ z for some z ∈ R (u) ⊆ R (w). Either way, we obtain a contradiction to the fact that V w (ϕ) = 1.
Clearly, M is a supp(M) ∪ {ψ}-determination of M. It is therefore left to prove that M is Glegal. Let s 1 , . . . , s n / s be a rule of G, σ a substitution and w ∈ W . Suppose that V w |= σ(s). Then frm[σ(s)] ⊆ supp(V w ) ∪ {ψ}. First, assume that frm[σ(s)] ⊆ supp(V w ). In this case, V w |= σ(s) as well. If s 1 , . . . , s n / s is positive, then since M is G-legal we have that either V w |= σ(s i ) for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that s i has an empty left side, or V u |= σ(s j ) for some 1 ≤ j ≤ n and u ∈ R (w) such that s j has a non-empty left side. Since M determines M, the same holds for V . If s 1 , . . . , s n / s is not positive, then similarly, we obtain that V w |= σ(s i ) for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
We therefore assume that frm[σ(s)] ⊆ supp(V w ), and thus ψ / ∈ supp(V w ), and so by the fact that G is ≺-directed, also frm[σ(s)] = {ψ}, and by the structurality of ≺, frm[σ(
First, suppose that s 1 , . . . , s n / s is not positive. Then σ(s) = ψ ⇒. We prove that V w |= σ(s i ) for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n. By our assumption, V w (ψ) = 1. This in particular means that S w G Int Γ w , ψ ⇒ ∆ w , and so there exists
, we must have σ(Γ i ) ⊆ Γ w and σ(∆ i ) ⊆ ∆ w , which means that V w |= σ(s i ). V w determines V w , and so V w |= σ(s i ).
Next, suppose that s 1 , . . . , s n / s is positive. Then σ(s) = ⇒ ψ. For M to respect s 1 , . . . , s n / s, we need to prove that: ( * ) There exists 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that either s i has an empty left side and V w |= σ(s i ), or s i has a non-empty left side and V z |= σ(s i ) for some z ∈ R (w).
We prove the following claim, ( * * ), and then show that ( * ) follows from ( * * ):
Proof of ( * * ): By our assumption, V w (ψ) = −1. According to the definition of V , there exists some u ∈ R (w) such that either V u (ψ) = −1 or S u G Int Γ u , ψ ⇒ ∆ u . We consider each case separately:
either s i has a non-empty left side and V z |= σ(s i ) for some z ∈ R (u) ⊆ R (w), or s i has an empty left side and V u |= σ(s i ).
2. S u G Int Γ u , ψ ⇒ ∆ u : Using (CUT) and the fact that S u G Int Γ u ⇒ ∆ u , we must have that S u G Int ⇒ ψ, and thus there exists some
Proof that ( * * ) implies ( * ): Let i and z as in ( * * ). Since M determines M, we also have V z |= σ(s i ). If s i happens to have a non-empty left side, then we are done, as the second disjunct of ( * ) holds. Otherwise, s i has the form ⇒ ∆ i . We prove that V w |= σ(⇒ ∆ i ). Let ϕ ∈ ∆ i . We prove that V w (σ(ϕ)) = −1. Since V z |= σ(⇒ ∆ i ), we have that V z (σ(ϕ)) = −1. M is a trimodel and wRz, and so
, and so V w (σ(ϕ)) = 0. We therefore have V w (σ(ϕ)) = −1. . We prove by induction on i that M i is defined, and is a G-legal Φ ≤i -determination of M, and also of M i−1 (for i ≥ 1).
For i = 0, this trivially holds. Now let i > 0. By the induction hypothesis, 
Conclusion
We identified two general families of propositional sequent calculi, in which a generalized subformula property is equivalent to cut-admissibility. The first is the family of pure calculi that are ≺-directed for some prefinite and structural order ≺. The second is a family of intuitionistic calculi, obtained by considering intuitionistic derivations in pure calculi that are ≺-directed. This result sheds light on the relation between these two fundamental properties.
We conclude by outlining several directions for further research. A first interesting question concerns the weak versions of cut-admissibility and analyticity. Similarly to the notions of strong and weak cutadmissibility (see Section 2), one can distinguish between strong and weak Int-cut-admissibility, ≺-analyticity, and Int-≺-analyticity. (Note that what we call here ≺-analyticity corresponds to strong ≺-analyticity; where a calculus G is weakly ≺-analytic if G s implies ≺ G s.) Now, it is known that for pure calculi, weak and strong cut-admissibility coincide, and that the same holds for ≺-analyticity (see [21] ). This is not the case, however, for intuitionistic calculi. For example, the calculus consisting of the rules p 1 ⇒ / ⇒ •p 1 and p 1 ⇒ / • p 1 ⇒ is weakly Int-≺ 0 -analytic, but not Int-≺ 0 -analytic. Also, it admits weak but not strong Int-cut-admissibility. A question that is left for further research is whether weak Int-≺-analyticity guarantees weak Int-cut-admissibility.
Second, the following questions regarding the relations between derivations and intuitionistic derivations are currently left open: Does ≺-analyticity imply Int-≺-analyticity? Does cut-admissibility imply Int-cut-admissibility? Do either of the converses hold?
Finally, our approach should be further developed for more expressive languages, which include quantifiers and modalities. For the former, the three-valued semantics should be elevated to three-valued first-order structures. The main obstacle, however, is the fact that the usual subformula relation in a first-order language is not prefinite, while our main construction requires enumerating formulas in a way that respects the subformula relation. For modalities, we expect that the Kripke semantics used here for intuitionistic calculi could be adapted for calculi with modalities. We note, however, that such an approach will have certain limitations, as some analytic calculi for modal logics (e.g., S5 and B [40, 33] ) do not admit cut-admissibility.
trivaluations, and (CUT) is valid whenever the cut formula ϕ satisfies v(ϕ) ∈ {−1, 1}. Finally, every application of a rule s 1 , . . . , s n / s of G must be valid in the set of G-legal trivaluations. Indeed, let σ(s 1 ) ∪ c 1 , . . . , σ(s n ) ∪ c n / σ(s) ∪ c 1 ∪ . . . ∪ c n be an application of this rule and v a G-legal trivaluation such that v |= σ(s i ) ∪ c i for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then either v |= c i for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n, or v |= σ(s i ) for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n. In both cases, v |= σ(s) ∪ c 1 ∪ . . . ∪ c n (in the first case this trivially holds, and in the second it holds since v is G-legal). Using the above, the proof proceeds by usual induction on the lengths of derivations.
A.2 Completeness
An ω-sequent is a pair L, R of (possibly infinite) sets of formulas, denoted L ⇒ R. For a set S of (ordinary) sequents and an ω-sequent L ⇒ R, we write S G L ⇒ R if there are finite Γ ⊆ L and ∆ ⊆ R such that S G Γ ⇒ ∆. The notations 
It is routine to extend s to a , S -maximal underivable ω-sequent L ⇒ R. Define a trivaluation v as follows:
Clearly, v |= s, and for every Γ ⇒ ∆ ∈ S we have that S Γ ⇒ ∆, which means that either Γ ⊆ L or ∆ ⊆ R, and so v |= Γ ⇒ ∆.
We show that v is G-legal. Let S 0 / Γ 0 ⇒ ∆ 0 be a rule of G and σ a substitution. Suppose that v |= σ(S 0 ). Let us show that for all Γ ⇒ ∆ ∈ S 0 , we have S L, σ(Γ) ⇒ σ(∆), R. Let Γ ⇒ ∆ ∈ S 0 . By our assumption, there exists either ϕ ∈ Γ such that v(σ(ϕ)) < 1 (and then
4 L ⇒ R is , S -underivable, and hence there must be either ϕ ∈ Γ 0 such that σ(ϕ) / ∈ L (and then v(σ(ϕ)) < 1) or ψ ∈ ∆ 0 such that σ(ψ) / ∈ R (and then v(σ(ψ)) > −1). In other words, v |= σ(Γ 0 ⇒ ∆ 0 ). Next, we distinguish the following cases:
we would then obtain S G L ⇒ R, which is a contradiction. 
Using (CUT), we get that the sequent
. Using weakening, together with the fact that ϕ ∈ ≺ [S ∪ {s}], we get that the sequent ( Like the above, the key point is to show that applications of rules of G are valid in G-legal trimodels. Let Γ 1 , σ(Γ 1 ) ⇒ σ(∆ 1 ), ∆ 1 , . . . , Γ n , σ(Γ n ) ⇒ σ(∆ n ), ∆ n Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n , σ(Γ 0 ) ⇒ σ(∆ 0 ), ∆ 1 , . . . , ∆ n be an application of a rule r = Γ 1 ⇒ ∆ 1 , . . . , Γ n ⇒ ∆ n / Γ 0 ⇒ ∆ 0 of G, and suppose that V w |= Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n , σ(Γ 0 ) ⇒ σ(∆ 0 ), ∆ 1 , . . . , ∆ n for some G-legal trimodel M = W, R, V and w ∈ W . We show that M |= Γ i , σ(Γ i ) ⇒ σ(∆ i ), ∆ i for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n. If r is not positive, then this is shown similarly to the soundness proof in Appendix A.1. Suppose that r is positive. Since V w |= Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n , σ(Γ 0 ) ⇒ σ(∆ 0 ), ∆ 1 , . . . , ∆ n , we have that V w |= Γ i ⇒ ∆ i for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Since M is G-legal, we have some 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that either Γ i = ∅ and V w |= σ(Γ i ⇒ ∆ i ), or Γ i = ∅ and V w |= σ(Γ i ⇒ ∆ i ) for some w ∈ R (w). In the first case we get that V w |= Γ i , σ(Γ i ) ⇒ σ(∆ i ), ∆ i . In the second, we have ∆ i = ∅ (since r is positive). Since V w |= Γ i ⇒, we have V w (ϕ) = 1 for every ϕ ∈ Γ i . M is a trimodel, and thus V w (ϕ) = 1 for every ϕ ∈ Γ i . We therefore have V w |= Γ i , σ(Γ i ) ⇒ σ(∆ i ), ∆ i .
B.2 Completeness for G Int and cf

G Int
Recall the definitions concerning ω-sequents (see appendix A.2), and adapt them to G Int and
, S a set of sequents and s a sequent such that S s. It is routine to extend s to a , S -maximal-underivable ω-sequent L s ⇒ R s .
Define a trimodel M = W, R, V as follows: W is the set of all , S -maximal-underivable ω-sequents; (L ⇒ R)R(L ⇒ R ) iff L ⊆ L ; and for every L ⇒ R ∈ W and ϕ ∈ L, V L⇒R (ϕ) = 1 if ϕ ∈ L, V L⇒R (ϕ) = −1 if ϕ ∈ R, and V L⇒R (ϕ) = 0 otherwise.
M is indeed a trimodel, as R is transitive and reflexive, and if ϕ ∈ L and (L ⇒ R)R(L ⇒ R ) then ϕ ∈ L . Also, M |= s, and M |= S.
We prove that M is G-legal. Let S 0 / Γ 0 ⇒ ∆ 0 be a positive rule of G, σ a substitution and L ⇒ R ∈ W . Suppose that V L⇒R |= σ(Γ 0 ⇒ ∆ 0 ). Then V L⇒R (σ(ϕ)) = 1 for every ϕ ∈ Γ 0 , and V L⇒R (σ(ψ)) = −1 for every ψ ∈ ∆ 0 . This means that S L, σ(Γ 0 ) ⇒ σ(∆ 0 ), R. Thus, we must either have S L, σ(Γ ) ⇒ σ(∆ ) for some Γ ⇒ ∆ ∈ S 0 with Γ = ∅, or S L ⇒ σ(∆ ), R for some ⇒ ∆ ∈ S 0 . In the first case, extend L, σ(Γ ) ⇒ σ(∆ ) to a , S -maximal-underivable ω-sequent L ⇒ R . Clearly, L ⊆ L , and V L ⇒R |= σ(Γ ⇒ ∆ ). In the second, the , S -maximality of L ⇒ R ensures that σ(∆ ) ⊆ R, which means that V L⇒R |= σ(⇒ ∆ ).
Next, let S 0 / Γ 0 ⇒ be a non-positive rule of G. Suppose that V L⇒R |= σ(Γ 0 ) ⇒. We prove that V L⇒R |= σ(Γ ⇒ ∆ ) for some Γ ⇒ ∆ ∈ S 0 . By our assumption, V L⇒R (σ(ϕ)) = 1 for every ϕ ∈ Γ 0 . This means that σ(Γ 0 ) ⊆ L. Now, since L ⇒ R ∈ W , we have S L, σ(Γ 0 ) ⇒ R. It follows that S L, σ(Γ ) ⇒ σ(∆ ), R for some Γ ⇒ ∆ ∈ S 0 . By the fact that L ⇒ R is , S -maximalunderivable, we have that σ(Γ ) ⊆ L and σ(∆ ) ⊆ R, which means that V L⇒R |= σ(Γ ⇒ ∆ ).
Finally, similarly to the proof of Theorems 4.8 and 4.14, If = G Int then M is fully determined, and if = Define a trimodel M = W, R, V as follows: W is the set of all maximal underivable ω-sequents; (L ⇒ R)R(L ⇒ R ) iff L ⊆ L ; and for every L ⇒ R ∈ W and ϕ ∈ L, V L⇒R (ϕ) = 1 if ϕ ∈ L, V L⇒R (ϕ) = −1 if ϕ ∈ R, and V L⇒R (ϕ) = 0 otherwise.
The proof that M is a trimodel that satisfies S but not s is the same as in the completeness proof for G Int and cf G Int . We prove that supp(V L⇒R ) = F for every L ⇒ R ∈ W , that is, L ∪ R = F (in particular, this means M is F-determined). Let L ⇒ R ∈ W . By definition, we have L ∪ R ⊆ F. Assume for contradiction that there exists ϕ ∈ F \ (L ∪ R). Since L ⇒ R is maximal and underivable, we have both S L ⇒ σ(∆ ), R for some ⇒ ∆ ∈ S 0 . In the first case, extend L, σ(Γ ) ⇒ σ(∆ ) to a maximal underivable ω-sequent L ⇒ R . Clearly, L ⊆ L , and V L ⇒R |= σ(Γ ⇒ ∆ ). In the second, the maximality of L ⇒ R ensures that σ(∆ ) ⊆ R, which means that V L⇒R |= σ(⇒ ∆ ).
Next, let S 0 / Γ 0 ⇒ be a non-positive rule of G. Suppose that V L⇒R |= σ(Γ 0 ) ⇒. We prove that V L⇒R |= σ(Γ ⇒ ∆ ) for some Γ ⇒ ∆ ∈ S 0 . By our assumption, σ(Γ 0 ) ⊆ L. Since L ⇒ R ∈ W , we have S F G Int L, σ(Γ 0 ) ⇒ R. Similarly to the above, it follows that S F G Int L, σ(Γ ) ⇒ σ(∆ ), R for some Γ ⇒ ∆ ∈ S 0 . By the fact that L ⇒ R is maximal and underivable, we have that σ(Γ ) ⊆ L and σ(∆ ) ⊆ R, which means that V L⇒R |= σ(Γ ⇒ ∆ ).
